This Thursday, Naftali Bennett plans to meet with the American president, presumably to discuss the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. Jacob Nagel and Mark Dubowitz outline the problems with Washington’s current approach to its negotiations with Tehran—which has been allowed to accumulate a dangerously large stockpile of nuclear-weapon fuel and has every intention of producing more. Given this precarious situation, the head of the Israeli government must seize this moment to make Israel’s security position clear:

Prime Minister Bennett will likely not confront the United States publicly. . . . But he needs to be firm in communicating Israel’s main principles. Israel must not be part of a new agreement that involves returning to the [2015 nuclear deal with Iran] and must maintain its full freedom of action while strengthening its military options for dealing with Iranian nuclear capabilities. The U.S. and Israel should work together on gathering intelligence on Iran’s weaponization program and not accept Tehran’s attempts to thwart the International Atomic Energy Commission’s inspections.

If there is no other option to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, the Jewish state will go it alone. Any hint that Jerusalem will only act with American consent implicates Washington, which is good for no one. It would make it more difficult for the Biden team to assert plausible deniability after a strike and may complicate or block Israeli action. Israel must avoid another critical error—it should not enter any talks with the Biden administration about “compensation” or the definition of a “longer and stronger” agreement before Iran officially agrees to enter this negotiation.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.