The recent wave of terrorism in Israel was touched off by two attacks linked to Islamic State (IS). Until now, notes Cole Bunzel, such attacks have been exceedingly rare, largely because IS “is not ideologically disposed” to focus its military efforts on the Jewish state. Bunzel sketches the objectives and attitudes of key IS leaders and concludes that, while the terrorist group may occasionally execute one-off strikes against Israel, it is unlikely to devote serious resources to it.

To understand how Islamic State views Israel, it is helpful to begin with the relevant statements of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006), the Jordanian founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq whose ideas form the foundation stone of the present-day caliphate. Palestine was not a prominent theme in al-Zarqawi’s speeches and lectures. Nor was attacking the Israelis a priority for him. On several occasions, he claimed that the liberation of Palestine would come only after victory had been achieved in Iraq and the Shiites had been subdued.

It was his view . . . that before one could effectively fight the “original unbelievers,” meaning the Jews and the Christians, it was first necessary to fight the Shiites. In this he was guided by his reading of medieval Islamic history, in particular the late Crusader period coinciding with rise of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (aka Saladin) and his defeat of the Shiite Fatimid caliphate in Egypt. In 1171, Saladin abolished the Fatimid caliphate and went on to construct a Sunni state spanning Egypt and Syria. A decade and a half later, in 1187, he captured Jerusalem following the decisive Battle of Hattin against the Crusader forces.

As Zarqawi saw it, there was “an important lesson” to be gleaned from this history. This was that “there will not be victory over the original unbelievers except after fighting the apostate unbelievers who are allied with the original believers.”

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.