At the University of California, Berkeley’s prestigious law school, a group called Law Students for Justice in Palestine (LSJP) has launched a campaign—apparently with some success—to convince other student organizations to adopt a bylaw pledging not only to support boycotting, divestment from, and sanctioning Israel (BDS) but also that they “will not invite speakers [who] have expressed and continued to hold views or host/sponsor/promote events in support of Zionism, the apartheid state of Israel, and the occupation of Palestine.” Richard Cravatts comments:

In language that is Orwellian in its attempt to paint bigotry as a virtue, the bylaw stated that student groups must proclaim that they are “publicly stipulating the organization’s position of anti-racism and anti-settler colonialism to speakers, ensuring that proposals for speakers emphasize the organization’s desire for equality and inclusion.” All of this is for the supposed purpose of creating “a safe and inclusive space for Palestinian students and students that are in support of the liberation of Palestine.”

After the law school’s dean, Erwin Chemerinsky, mildly criticized the bylaw in an open letter, LSJP took to Instagram again to suggest that free speech should only be enjoyed by the oppressed and “marginalized” like themselves. Anyone supporting the racist, apartheid regime of Israel should not have access to the same expression, they claimed. It is perfectly reasonable, they asserted, for pro-Israel dialogue to be suppressed.

The notion that a vocal minority of self-important student ideologues can determine what views may or may not be expressed at a particular law school is not only antithetical to the purpose of a university but vaguely fascistic. It grants power to the few to decide what can be said and what must be suppressed. It is what former Yale University president Bartlett Giamatti characterized as the “tyranny of group self-righteousness.”

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.