Last week, the Islamic Resistance Movement—better known by the Arabic acronym Hamas—held a rally in Gaza City to celebrate the 35th anniversary of its founding. Devorah Margolin surveys the group’s history and observes that it has changed little despite more recent efforts to show off its supposedly more moderate side:

As Hamas has repeatedly noted, two main documents highlight its goals and evolving direction: the 1988 charter, and the May 2017 update to the charter, titled the “Document of General Principles and Policies.” The latter document represented a rhetorical shift, with the group seeking to present itself as a centrist alternative to global jihadist organizations like Islamic State and secular nationalist groups like the PLO. Despite this framing, however, the updated principles and policies also declared that “resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine will remain a legitimate right, a duty, and an honor for all the sons and daughters of our people and our umma [global Islamic community].”

Another contradiction can be seen in the group’s framing of Islamization as a “choice” driven by individuals. For example, Hamas has repeatedly argued that while wearing the hijab is a religious obligation, it remains a woman’s choice to do so, not something that can be forced upon her. At the same time, however, the group does not discount acts of violence and pressure to achieve its goals of a “traditional” Islamic society, such as running “virtue” campaigns to discourage “Western” behaviors, excluding male teachers from girls’ schools, segregating classes after age nine, and penalizing male driving instructors who do not have a chaperone for female students.

As Hamas continues to strive for international legitimacy, it will no doubt highlight what it considers to be its most laudable traits. . . . The United States and its allies should not be distracted by this seemingly more moderate approach. Despite its rhetorical embrace of change in certain contexts, Hamas remains committed to its original goal—violent struggle against Israel by any means necessary, with itself at the helm of Palestinian leadership.

Concluded in 1979, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ended nearly 30 years of intermittent warfare, and proved one of the most enduring and beneficial products of Middle East diplomacy. But Egypt may not have been upholding its end of the bargain, write Jonathan Schanzer and Mariam Wahba:

Article III, subsection two of the peace agreement’s preamble explicitly requires both parties “to ensure that that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory.” This clause also mandates both parties to hold accountable any perpetrators of such acts.

Recent Israeli operations along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land bordering Egypt and Gaza, have uncovered multiple tunnels and access points used by Hamas—some in plain sight of Egyptian guard towers. While it could be argued that Egypt has lacked the capacity to tackle this problem, it is equally plausible that it lacks the will. Either way, it’s a serious problem.

Was Egypt motivated by money, amidst a steep and protracted economic decline in recent years? Did Cairo get paid off by Hamas, or its wealthy patron, Qatar? Did the Iranians play a role? Was Egypt threatened with violence and unrest by the Sinai’s Bedouin Union of Tribes, who are the primary profiteers of smuggling, if it did not allow the tunnels to operate? Or did the Sisi regime take part in this operation because of an ideological hatred of Israel?