In the wee hours of yesterday morning, the IDF carried out simultaneous targeted attacks on Gaza, killing three senior commanders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). It followed up with further airstrikes on terrorist infrastructure in the Strip. Last week, PIJ launched 102 rockets into southern Israel, and then agreed to a ceasefire after limited Israeli retaliation. Meir Ben Shabbat comments:

Israel has achieved its initial goals in its current operation against PIJ, code-named Operation Shield and Arrow. The Jewish state restored its deterrence against the radical terror organization, while demonstrating that the ongoing internal political debates will not prevent it from taking determined action against external enemies. However, the hostilities in Gaza, which began with targeted strikes against three PIJ leaders last night, have the potential to expand and inflame multiple arenas. Israel therefore must take several steps now to ensure that this operation remains a success.

In analyzing Israel’s latest strikes, it is important to recall that PIJ . . . is one of Iran’s main proxies in the region, funded by Iran to the tune of millions of dollars a year.

A PIJ response to last night’s targeted strikes against its leaders and military sites is a certainty. It will likely come once its remaining commanders have had a chance to go underground. The questions that remain are whether Hamas, the largest terror organization in Gaza, will join in the fighting, and whether PIJ will be able to expand the hostilities to other geographic arenas.

At this point, Israel must focus on several goals. Operation Shield and Arrow must end with PIJ not only having suffered major losses, but having failed to reach any significant achievements in its attacks against Israel. That will diminish its standing and deter it from conducting future attacks. . . . Secondly, Israel must make clear to PIJ that any attempts to expand the circle of fighting to other arenas will greatly increase the severity of Israel’s response.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.