At the beginning of this month, an Egyptian border policeman named Mohamed Salah killed three Israelis soldiers—and received much praise from a broad cross-section of Egyptian society. The incident highlights the paradox whereby Cairo and Jerusalem work together very closely on matters of security, but anti-Semitism and hostility toward Israel are widespread among the Egyptian populace, and evident in state-controlled media. Haisam Hassanein explains what could be done to rectify this situation:

The most pragmatic way for President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to start changing the conversation about Israel inside Egypt may be to begin in Tel Aviv, where Cairo maintains a lethargic embassy whose staff is not curious about Israel and does little to promote a warmer peace. For example, the embassy does not facilitate visits for Egyptian businessmen and academics interested in cooperating with their neighbor to the north.

Egyptian diplomats barely participate in public events organized by the Israeli foreign ministry, academic institutions, or commercial entities. Many of them do not speak either English or Hebrew and live in Arab Israeli towns. The few who have command of English and Hebrew spend most of their time between Ramallah and Bethlehem. Unlike every other Egyptian embassy, the mission in Tel Aviv has no official Twitter account or Facebook page.

To encourage a change, American and Israeli officials must communicate to their Egyptian counterparts behind closed doors that keeping their relationship with Israel secret is the wrong approach.

U.S. congressional delegations visiting Israel should make a special point of knocking on the door of the Egyptian embassy. Cairo’s envoy, Ambassador Khaled Azami, did not even attend the funeral services of the soldiers killed last week, nor did he visit the wounded. Those who visit Azami should point out how he can revive his diminished status in town by becoming more of a public figure, since Abraham Accords ambassadors are celebrated everywhere in Israel.

In a sense, the most successful negotiation with Hamas was the recent agreement securing the release of Edan Alexander, the last living hostage with a U.S. passport. Unlike those previously handed over, he wasn’t exchanged for Palestinian prisoners, and there was no cease-fire. Dan Diker explains what Hamas got out of the deal:

Alexander’s unconditional release [was] designed to legitimize Hamas further as a viable negotiator and to keep Hamas in power, particularly at a moment when Israel is expanding its military campaign to conquer Gaza and eliminate Hamas as a military, political, and civil power. Israel has no other option than defeating Hamas. Hamas’s “humanitarian” move encourages American pressure on Israel to end its counterterrorism war in service of advancing additional U.S. efforts to release hostages over time, legitimizing Hamas while it rearms, resupplies, and reestablishes it military power and control.

In fact, Hamas-affiliated media have claimed credit for successful negotiations with the U.S., branding the release of Edan Alexander as the “Edan deal,” portraying Hamas as a rising international player, sidelining Israel from direct talks with DC, and declaring this a “new phase in the conflict.”

Fortunately, however, Washington has not coerced Jerusalem into ceasing the war since Alexander’s return. Nor, Diker observes, did the deal drive a wedge between the two allies, despite much speculation about the possibility.