At the beginning of this month, an Egyptian border policeman named Mohamed Salah killed three Israelis soldiers—and received much praise from a broad cross-section of Egyptian society. The incident highlights the paradox whereby Cairo and Jerusalem work together very closely on matters of security, but anti-Semitism and hostility toward Israel are widespread among the Egyptian populace, and evident in state-controlled media. Haisam Hassanein explains what could be done to rectify this situation:

The most pragmatic way for President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to start changing the conversation about Israel inside Egypt may be to begin in Tel Aviv, where Cairo maintains a lethargic embassy whose staff is not curious about Israel and does little to promote a warmer peace. For example, the embassy does not facilitate visits for Egyptian businessmen and academics interested in cooperating with their neighbor to the north.

Egyptian diplomats barely participate in public events organized by the Israeli foreign ministry, academic institutions, or commercial entities. Many of them do not speak either English or Hebrew and live in Arab Israeli towns. The few who have command of English and Hebrew spend most of their time between Ramallah and Bethlehem. Unlike every other Egyptian embassy, the mission in Tel Aviv has no official Twitter account or Facebook page.

To encourage a change, American and Israeli officials must communicate to their Egyptian counterparts behind closed doors that keeping their relationship with Israel secret is the wrong approach.

U.S. congressional delegations visiting Israel should make a special point of knocking on the door of the Egyptian embassy. Cairo’s envoy, Ambassador Khaled Azami, did not even attend the funeral services of the soldiers killed last week, nor did he visit the wounded. Those who visit Azami should point out how he can revive his diminished status in town by becoming more of a public figure, since Abraham Accords ambassadors are celebrated everywhere in Israel.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.