According to a series of recent reports, the Biden administration is considering a limited agreement with Tehran in which the latter will slow down its nuclear activities in exchange for millions of dollars in sanctions relief. Seeking to avoid the congressional oversight that would be triggered by any sort of formal deal with Iran, the White House has been careful to refer to this arrangement simply as an “understanding.” Jacob Nagel examines the problems posed by this policy, and how the Jewish state should react:

The idea is to freeze Iran’s progress when it comes to highly enriched uranium in exchange for partial sanctions relief (oil sales), the release of some frozen funds, and the freeing of prisoners. . . . The agreement will legitimize all previous Iranian violations [of its nuclear commitments] and allow Iran to retain the assets obtained through the ongoing violation of all agreements and treaties it has signed, while injecting billions of dollars to revitalize the economy. It will also enable [Tehran’s] continued support of terrorism in the Middle East and around the world.

Israel must highlight up front—and loudly—the dangers of the provisions being formulated and express firm opposition even at the cost of harming the prospect of a possible deal with Saudi Arabia, which in itself is very important but much less so than concessions given to Iran on its nuclear program.

Iran is trying to draw Israel into a multi-theater conflagration while staying out of direct confrontation for the time being. Israel must continue to improve its military capabilities while at the same time send a clear message against the understandings being formulated. Every hint that there is anything to talk about will convey that Israel is weak—like the U.S.—and cannot be trusted. The message will reach our friends in the Gulf, those who have signed agreements with us, and those who may sign in the future—but only if Israel will remain strong against the Iranian threats.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.