According to a series of recent reports, the Biden administration is considering a limited agreement with Tehran in which the latter will slow down its nuclear activities in exchange for millions of dollars in sanctions relief. Seeking to avoid the congressional oversight that would be triggered by any sort of formal deal with Iran, the White House has been careful to refer to this arrangement simply as an “understanding.” Jacob Nagel examines the problems posed by this policy, and how the Jewish state should react:

The idea is to freeze Iran’s progress when it comes to highly enriched uranium in exchange for partial sanctions relief (oil sales), the release of some frozen funds, and the freeing of prisoners. . . . The agreement will legitimize all previous Iranian violations [of its nuclear commitments] and allow Iran to retain the assets obtained through the ongoing violation of all agreements and treaties it has signed, while injecting billions of dollars to revitalize the economy. It will also enable [Tehran’s] continued support of terrorism in the Middle East and around the world.

Israel must highlight up front—and loudly—the dangers of the provisions being formulated and express firm opposition even at the cost of harming the prospect of a possible deal with Saudi Arabia, which in itself is very important but much less so than concessions given to Iran on its nuclear program.

Iran is trying to draw Israel into a multi-theater conflagration while staying out of direct confrontation for the time being. Israel must continue to improve its military capabilities while at the same time send a clear message against the understandings being formulated. Every hint that there is anything to talk about will convey that Israel is weak—like the U.S.—and cannot be trusted. The message will reach our friends in the Gulf, those who have signed agreements with us, and those who may sign in the future—but only if Israel will remain strong against the Iranian threats.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.