Until the 1979 Islamic revolution, Tehran maintained cordial ties with Jerusalem—cultivated as part of David Ben-Gurion’s “periphery strategy” that emphasized diplomacy with countries further afield than Israel’s then-hostile neighbors. Jason Brodsky sees in this relationship a model for the Jewish state to follow as it aims to expand the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia and other Arab states:

Israel aspired to establish formal diplomatic relations with Iran, yet according to a declassified 1959 U.S. intelligence report, Tehran was hesitant to do so because it did not want to offend Arab countries or elements in Iran that would react adversely to overt moves. These sensitivities are reminiscent of Saudi Arabia’s concerns over normalizing ties with Israel today, weighing its own unique equities given King Salman’s role as the custodian of the two holy mosques and the [possible] reaction from the broader Islamic world.

[Yet] the shah of Iran was able to maintain these close ties with Israel while holding diplomatic relations with the Arab world, which remained hostile to the Jewish state, although Egypt severed ties [with the shah] in 1960 in protest over his affirmation of de-facto recognition of Israel. The shah once told a Lebanese publication that there was “no contradiction” between Iran’s support for Arab countries and economic ties with Israel. Likewise, leaders of the Abraham Accords countries, namely the United Arab Emirates, have been able to maintain full diplomatic relations with both Israel and the Islamic Republic. This is especially relevant after Saudi Arabia agreed to restore ties with Iran in March 2023 while at the same time continuing to eye a normalization deal with Israel.

In the end, Ben-Gurion’s description of ties with Iran in the 1950s—“friendly, informal but not hidden, and based on mutual benefit”—offered a template for Israel’s development of relations with Arab countries years later. Currently, Israel’s relationship with the Abraham Accords countries can be characterized as more advanced than they were under the shah of Iran, namely because what was more informal and partial then is formal and complete today with regional players like Bahrain and the UAE.

This week, there have been numerous unconfirmed reports about the fate of Esmail Qaani, who is the head of the Quds Force, the expeditionary arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Benny Avni writes:

On Thursday, Sky News Arabic reported that Mr. Qaani was rushed to a hospital after suffering a heart attack. He became [the Quds Force] commander in 2020, after an American drone strike killed his predecessor, Qassem Suleimani. The unit oversees the Islamic Republic’s various Mideast proxies, as well as the exporting of the Iranian revolution to the region and beyond.

The Sky News report attempts to put to rest earlier claims that Mr. Qaani was killed at Beirut. It follows several reports asserting he has been arrested and interrogated at Tehran over suspicion that he, or a top lieutenant, leaked information to Israel. Five days ago, the Arabic-language al-Arabiya network reported that Mr. Qaani “is under surveillance and isolation, following the Israeli assassinations of prominent Iranian leaders.”

Iranians are desperately scrambling to plug possible leaks that gave Israel precise intelligence to conduct pinpoint strikes against Hizballah commanders. . . . “I find it hard to believe that Qaani was compromised,” an Iran watcher at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, Beni Sabti, tells the Sun. Perhaps one or more of [Qaani’s] top aides have been recruited by Israel, he says, adding that “psychological warfare” could well be stoking the rumor mill.

If so, prominent Iranians seem to be exacerbating the internal turmoil by alleging that the country’s security apparatus has been infiltrated.