In 2020, Rabat and Jerusalem renewed their diplomatic ties in the wake of the Abraham Accords, and since then relations have been cordial. But there have also been setbacks, due in part to flare-ups in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and in part to Israel’s reluctance to acknowledge Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara, where the North African country faces violent armed opposition from the Polisario Front. Eran Lerman, after examining these and other impediments to warmer relations, explains why “prospects remain bright.”

Tourism (including visits by tens of thousands of Israelis who are of Moroccan origin) is thriving. The military cooperation framework signed in November has already led to significant arms deals: Morocco recently unveiled its acquisition of [the Israeli firm] Elbit’s PULS (Precise and Universal Launch System) multiple heavy rocket launchers (already supplied to Azerbaijan as well). Economic investment and infrastructure development were at the core of discussions in the trilateral non-governmental conference (with the UAE) in Marrakech in November.

Israel’s actions need to reflect not only the importance of the bilateral relationship but also the need to confront region-wide Iranian subversion. The Islamic Republic’s revolutionary regime has been involved in the Western Sahara conflict for decades, and its attitude toward the Moroccan monarchy is hostile. . . . Since early this year, more and more reports indicate that Iranian aid to Polisario has been upgraded—among other items, it may include the supply, via Algeria, of attack drones similar to those Iran has been providing to Russia.

Israel has an interest in confronting an Iranian presence on every front and demonstrating the utility of close security cooperation with Jerusalem. That would build upon the agreements already reached and signed during the reciprocal visits of the defense ministers and the chiefs of staff. It could also help unleash the full economic potential of relations with Morocco on a wide range of subjects, from gas exploration to advanced water technologies.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.