In February, Israeli authorities arrested a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leader named Khader Adnan in the West Bank. He soon went on a hunger strike, leading to his death by starvation on May 2—to which PIJ, based in the Gaza Strip, responded by launching over 100 rockets at Israeli civilians. On May 9, after careful planning, the IDF conducted a 72-hour assault on Gaza, destroying PIJ and Hamas military infrastructure. Eado Hecht explains that this campaign must be understood through the lens of the West Bank:

The Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority has reduced its operations against Palestinian perpetrators of violence against Israelis. The majority of attackers over the past year have been Fatah proxies, whether organized in new groups (such as the Lions’ Den) or operating as “lone wolves”—i.e., individuals who have been incited to attack Israelis by official propaganda (Fatah-controlled news media, religious sermons, and school education programs) but are not officially affiliated with any organization.

Israel responded by stepping up counterterrorism operations in the West Bank. In Operation Breakwater, Israeli forces began routinely to enter sovereign Palestinian areas in raids to arrest or kill terrorists identified by Israeli intelligence whom the Palestinian security forces refused to arrest. Most of these raids face violent resistance involving firearms, grenades, improvised explosive devices, and so on. The Israeli raids have gradually captured or killed numerous Palestinian Islamic Jihad personnel, as well as many other terrorists.

Stopping these raids, and continuing to foment violence in Judea and Samaria, was the ultimate goal of PIJ’s missile strikes, Hecht argues:

Only time will tell if the Israeli military success will be translated into a long-term ceasefire with Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. The group’s casualties were not catastrophic for an organization with approximately 10,000 personnel, but with six commanders killed plus two commanders killed in Operation Breaking Dawn nearly ten months ago (together with at least ten other combatants in that operation), its military leadership has been mauled. It has also lost a considerable portion of its weaponry and weapons-manufacturing infrastructure,  though it still has enough to renew the fighting.

Meanwhile, the goal set by Palestinian Islamic Jihad in both the escalations—to deter Israel from continuing Operation Breakwater in the West Bank—has not been achieved.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.