On Saturday morning, a member of the Lebanese parliament led a group of about seventeen people into Israeli territory. The IDF promptly fired warning shots, forcing the group to retreat back to the other side of the Blue Line—the provisional boundary between Israel and Lebanon that the UN established in 2000. While this may seem like a minor incident, it follows on the heels of Hizballah operatives setting up tents on the Israeli side of the Blue Line, trying to sabotage the border fence and start fires near Israeli villages, and flagrantly violating the terms of the 2006 ceasefire that ended the Second Lebanon War. Assaf Orion comments:

Although Israel assesses that Hizballah is not interested in initiating a war at present, senior IDF officials recently warned of the group’s growing appetite for challenges that risk unintended escalation (e.g., the March bombing near Megiddo; the April rocket salvo by Hamas cells in south Lebanon).

Israel faces a strategic dilemma. . . . The remaining tent, [others have been removed], presents no military threat, and attempting to answer the challenge with quiet diplomacy is a prudent first step. Yet in seeking to restrain such provocations without deteriorating into all-out war, Israel’s measured use of force (e.g., intercepting last year’s drones without an offensive response; responding to the Megiddo attack by striking Syria rather than Lebanon; striking harmless targets in response to the April rocket strikes) has emboldened Hizballah’s aggression and invited political grandstanding in Beirut. Accepting Lebanon’s demands could project weakness and invite additional provocations.

If the group’s presence in Israeli territory persists, as is now increasingly probable, Israel should prepare to remove it at a time of its choosing—and prepare for possible escalation if Hizballah forcefully opposes this removal or engages in any other aggression.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.