When the Oslo Accords were signed in September 1993, it was hoped that they would lead to the end of the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of an enduring system of Palestinian self-government. Their failure to do so has been blamed on many factors, but one of the least noted is the endemic corruption within the Palestinian Authority (PA), established pursuant to the accords in 1994. To Khaled Abu Toameh, this widespread self-dealing is perhaps the greatest impediment to peace:

The allegations of corruption, leveled against the Palestinian Authority almost from day one, severely undermined the credibility of the former PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, in the eyes of their people. . . . One of the main priorities of these two leaders has been to prove that, when it comes to dealing with Israel, they are not “getting into bed with the enemy” for personal profit. Countering this perception has superseded their considerations of making peace with Israel.

From the very beginning of the “peace process” in 1993, many Palestinians saw it as a “transaction” between the Israeli government and the corrupt PLO leadership that was hungry for money after being dumped by many Arab countries as retaliation for supporting the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. After the liberation of Kuwait a year later, the oil-rich emirates and other Gulf states decided to cut off funds to the PLO, causing the organization one of its most serious financial crises.

The Oslo Accords, however, saved the PLO from collapsing once the Arab financial aid was replaced with massive funds by the United States, Europe, and other countries. Many Palestinians observed that the only things the “peace process” brought about were the enrichment of senior PLO officials and their family members and associates who greedily siphoned publicly designated funds to drive luxury cars and build extravagant mansions, particularly in Ramallah and the Gaza Strip.

Western donors’ failure, or refusal, in the first two decades after the “peace process,” to hold the Palestinian Authority accountable for their outlandish abuse of funds was one of the main reasons most Palestinians lost faith in the Oslo Accords. Moreover, it was also one of the primary reasons so many Palestinians were radicalized and ultimately voted for Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary election.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.