Last month, Hizballah operatives set up two tents on the southern side of the Blue Line, the de-facto border the UN established between Israel and Lebanon after the IDF withdrew completely from the country in 2000. Jerusalem filed a formal complaint with the UN, which in turn sent its peacekeepers to investigate. So far, only one of the tents has been removed. The Institute for National Security Studies explains:

Hizballah’s erection of the tents and its determination not to remove them reflect a recent rise in the organization’s confidence and its increased boldness vis-à-vis Israel, along with a willingness to take risks. Incidents from the last few months reflect this clearly, [such as] the terrorist attack at Megiddo Junction by a Palestinian attacker who infiltrated from the northern border (March 13), and the rocket fire from Lebanon (April 6).

It seems that Hizballah is spurred by its mistaken understanding that the internal difficulties in Israel since the establishment of the current government reflect weakness, and that Israel does not have an interest at the current time in conducting a campaign against it. In our understanding, Hizballah is also not interested in a large-scale military campaign but interprets the developments as an opportunity for it to improve the balance of deterrence against the IDF and to expand its presence in southern Lebanon and its grip on the border.

Israel must use every possible means to remove the Hizballah tents at Har Dov, and for two main reasons. On the ground, Israel must stop Hizballah’s efforts to expand its presence next to the border. Hizballah is trying gradually to create a new reality, while penetrating into Israel’s sovereign territory—a situation that Israel cannot accept. On the strategic level, Israel must demonstrate force and determination in order to improve the balance of deterrence versus Hizballah in Israel’s favor, after it has eroded recently.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.