While Israel has begun to tap into its offshore natural-gas fields, the reserve off the coast of the Gaza Strip remains unexplored, due to a 1999 agreement that puts it under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—with the stipulation that it cannot be developed without Jerusalem’s permission. The Israeli government granted that permission last month. Elai Rettig and Benny Spanier examine the decision:

When Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, Israel didn’t want revenue from the field to fall into its hands, so it blocked further progress. New negotiations began over a year ago through Egypt, and a breakthrough occurred last week. Egypt wants to sponsor the project, and most of the gas will be sold to Egypt’s energy sector, and perhaps also exported to Europe [in liquid form].

There are various reasons why Israel might have approved a deal that will most likely benefit Hamas. . . . One possibility . . . is that this is part of a larger Egyptian/Israeli effort to calm the political situation in Gaza between its warring factions (Hamas vs. Islamic Jihad). There’s also a plan to build a new harbor in Egypt to bring more goods into Gaza and help its economy. Although, officially, only the PA in the West Bank will receive the gas revenue, there’s no denying that Hamas will get some of it too. If that were not the case, it would not allow the field to be developed. Israel’s approval might be a reward from Jerusalem to Hamas for helping it oppose Islamic Jihad militants during the last round of violence in Gaza in May 2023.

A [further] reason for Israel’s approval could be incentives provided by other parties in the region. They may have conditioned impending political or economic agreements with Israel on concessions to the Palestinians like this one. Motivations could include a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia or an energy trade deal of some kind with Turkey.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.