Since Spain’s withdrawal from the territory in 1975, Western Sahara has been disputed by Morocco, Mauritania, and an indigenous revolutionary group called the Polisario Front, which has proclaimed a sovereign Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Yechiel Leiter highlights some telling facts about this statelet:

In 2020, the Polisario broke the 29-year-old ceasefire with renewed terror attacks on Moroccan installations. In an effort led by Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Mauritania, and Syria, a total of 46 countries have to date recognized the SADR.

Meanwhile, Jerusalem and Rabat have been growing closer since the renewal of diplomatic relations in 2020. Leiter argues that Israel should now follow America’s example and recognize Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara:

Israel must work to solidify and expand, in particular, its existing Abraham Accords agreement with Morocco. The genius of the Abraham Accords was their formal expression of what was sensed by Arab states in the region but had been left unspoken. Mutual national interests far exceed the Palestinian issue in their importance. Partnership and collaboration in stopping the spread of radicalism through the long arm of Iran are top among them.

To its east, [Morocco] shares a long border with Algeria, an ally of Iran, which directly threatens it militarily and through its support for Polisario separatism. Polisario headquarters are located in Tindouf, Algeria, where 100,000 Sahrawis live. Were the Polisario to achieve its goal, it would be nothing more than an Algerian puppet state contributing to strengthening an Iranian proxy with growing influence in countries across the sub-Sahara. Algeria’s military strength and ideological influence need to be mitigated, not augmented, and certainly not at the expense of a Western ally. To the south, Morocco is bordered by Mauritania, presently governed by an Islamist-leaning regime that is hostile to Israel and the West and which similarly needs no strengthening.

The Polisario represents the lethal connection between separatism and terrorism, a legacy of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements now supported by Tehran. . . . Morocco has thwarted many terrorist attacks against European countries by home-grown Islamists. Morocco’s battle against the Polisario and terrorism is also Israel’s battle.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.