At least since March, when its operatives set off a bomb near the town of Megiddo, injuring an Israeli, Hizballah has engaged in acts that seem intended to provoke Jerusalem, or at least to test its limits. Jacob Nagel argues that a firmer approach is necessary:

Israel must punish Hizballah for every provocation and attempt to change the situation on the ground in Lebanon, but this is not enough: Israel must also punish those who fund and encourage Hizballah, i.e., Iran. The Iranian punishment does not have to come immediately or directly; there are many ways and means to harm and weaken Iran.

The IDF knows how to carry out such a shift in policy. As has been the case in the recent operations in Jenin and many times in the past in Gaza, Judea, and Samaria, this must include the element of surprise, subterfuge, and a disproportionate response that will harm [Hizballah’s secretary general Hassan] Nasrallah, his organization, and the state of Lebanon. The fear of escalation is understandable, but it cannot be the leading factor in the decision-making process by the IDF and the cabinet. The IDF is the strongest power in the Middle East; those who should fear a potential deterioration are Hizballah, Iran, and Lebanon. If Israel will act wisely, this will be the case, as we have seen in the past.

Nasrallah understands strength and identifies weaknesses, and now his perception (never mind if he is right or wrong) is that Israel has been deterred; . . . he must be disabused of that notion.

I am definitely not calling for a war in the north, but in order to prevent a war, Nasrallah must understand that it will not break out on his terms, nor will it end by the power of his decision. If Nasrallah will not understand the message, Israel must take the initiative.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.