The most frequently voiced criticism of the Abraham Accords is that they somehow constitute a betrayal of the Palestinians—even though it is rarely explained how Palestinians might be harmed by Israel’s warmer relations with their Arab brethren, or how 75 years of war and hostility has improved their lot. If the claim of betrayal were correct, one might expect Palestinians to be the most hostile of all Arabs to recent peacemaking. Yet the opposite is true. Frances McDonough writes:

When compared to the average 16 percent of other Arab publics in the April 2023 poll who viewed the Abraham Accords as “somewhat” or “very” positive for the region, attitudes in Gaza and east Jerusalem are starkly different. Notably, 47 percent in Gaza and 63 percent in east Jerusalem express a positive view of the regional impact of the Accords. And while the percentage of those who held this opinion shrinks in the West Bank, it is a similar proportion to the UAE, which had the most positive response in April 2023 at 27 percent.

That said, a solid majority in all three locations—58 precent in Gaza, 61 percent in the West Bank, and 64 percent in east Jerusalem—agree with the following statement: “Arab governments are neglecting the Palestinians and starting to make friends with Israel, because they think the Palestinians should be more willing to compromise.” And, as discussed in a separate article, a significant number of Gazans and some West Bankers agree that Palestinian leadership should normalize with Israel were Saudi Arabia to do so.

Another issue on which Palestinians diverge from other Arab publics was the prospect of receiving aid from Israel in the wake of a natural disaster. Whereas at least two thirds of other Arab publics (and an almost unanimous 98 percent in Lebanon) agreed with the statement: “In the case of an earthquake or other natural disaster, as we just saw in Syria and Turkey, Arab countries should refuse humanitarian aid from Israel,” this percentage dips to 50 percent in Gaza, 58 percent in the West Bank, and 59 percent in east Jerusalem.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.