Yesterday, an Israeli woman was murdered, and an Israeli man severely wounded, in a drive-by shooting outside of Hebron. On Saturday, another terrorist killed a father and son at a carwash. The Israeli media has described these as lone-wolf attacks, since the perpetrators do not appear to be acting on direct orders from any known jihadist group. Nadav Shragai rejects this characterization:

The attackers may decide on their own where to strike and they do it on their own, but they drink from the same poisonous well that makes the killing of Jews kosher, be it because “al-Aqsa Mosque is being desecrated” or just in the name of Islam or the Palestinian cause. The incitement and hatred have no organizational affiliation.

The Palestinian Authority (PA), for its own reasons, may be assisting Israel in capturing dozens of killers but it has not lifted a finger in an effort to stop the worshiping of death and martyrdom. It has not stopped the explicit incitement to kill Jews for being Jews. It has allowed the continuation of terrorist glorification; it continues paying families of terrorists and has been memorializing them upon their death. Perceptually, it has been breeding terrorists and helping them grow, while occasionally helping Israel detain them in extreme cases.

Just last week, the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center published a study showing that in the Palestinian textbooks issued by the PA, Israel doesn’t even exist. The study noted that the Palestinian prime minister recently took part in a ceremony honoring parents of “martyrs,” [i.e., Palestinians who lost their lives committing acts of terror], who were killed during the past year, and vowed that the PA would not bow to pressure by altering its subject matter, regardless of whether the donor countries will stop the funding spigot.

During the ceremony, there was even a picture shown of a “lone-wolf terrorist.”

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.