Increasingly, the island nations of the Pacific are becoming a crucial area of competition between the U.S. and China, as seen by Beijing’s recent, and apparently successful, efforts to bring the Solomon Islands into its orbit. Many of these small states also have good relations with the Jewish state, and several have outstanding records of voting with it at the UN. Avi Kumar writes:

This year, Papua New Guinea and Fiji announced that they would establish embassies in Israel. . . . Countries that have voted in Israel’s favor over several resolutions are the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, and Nauru, [the last of which recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital].

President Chaim Herzog was the first Israeli president to officially visit Fiji and Tonga in the 1980s. In 2020, then-president Reuven Rivlin visited the two nations. He would later tell then-Samoan prime minister Susuga Tuilaepa Sa’ilele Malielegaoi that he regretted not having visited his country. The previous year, Samoa and Israel arranged a visa-waiver scheme under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Most Oceanians are now Christian, so they have read biblical stories and are familiar with Jewish history. . . . Over the last two decades, Israeli trade with Papua New Guinea has doubled in volume, with these ties culminating in the creation of the future embassy. Papua is very resource rich. The continent holds deposits of lead, zinc, cobalt, and gold that Israel could import for its industries.

Many Oceanian countries have agriculture-dominated economies, with fishing and production of crops such as coconut and sugar. Israel could import these products and also assist with agricultural innovations. In addition, underutilized crops from the Australian desert that were historically consumed by aboriginals may possibly also be grown in the Negev Desert. . . . Oceanian islands are prone to disasters such as tsunamis and active volcanoes. Israel’s ability to assist with relief—as witnessed during the February 2023 Turkey-Syria earthquake—could prove critical.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.