In 2010, Syria was the only Arab state that posed a serious military threat to Israel. Egypt was friendly, Saddam Hussein was out of the picture, and other Arab countries had neither the desire nor the ability to wage war. After the uprising that began in 2011, the regime of Bashar al-Assad grew far weaker, while its army concentrated its efforts on killing its own people. The IDF, meanwhile, has carried out hundreds of airstrikes to stop Iran from establishing certain military capabilities in the country. Eden Kaduri, Yehoshua Kalisky, and Tal Avraham consider the possibility that, as the war winds down, Damascus might once again pose a conventional threat:

As the civil war began to ebb, and particularly in 2015–2018, the Syrian military underwent many structural changes, with the cooperation of Russia and Iran. Since 2018, the Syrian military renewed its fortification and the annual training to prepare for war against Israel, while at the same time trying to increase its independence. The regime in Damascus invested major sums in rebuilding the Syrian military, and there are force-buildup and reorganization measures, including new personnel appointments. This comes against the background of recent years of positive developments for the Bashar al-Assad regime.

Over the past decade, . . . the main focus of Israeli attention has been Iranian entrenchment on Syrian soil, the Shiite militias that operate freely in Syria, and Damascus’s role in arming Hizballah. Against this backdrop, there is a tendency to overlook the threat posed by a stronger Syrian military. The firing of an anti-aircraft missile from Syria into Israel in early July 2023, in response to an alleged Israeli airstrike on Syria, was a reminder of the current and potential threat.

According to estimates, before the civil war, [Syria’s] Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), better known by its French acronym CERS—which is under the auspices of the Syrian Ministry of Defense and is responsible for manufacture and development of weapons for the military—was one of the most advanced research and development centers in the Middle East. . . . . CERS also provides arms and ammunition to Hizballah. . . . Over the past decade, CERS is estimated to have made a quantum leap in its capabilities, especially in the fields of precision munitions and the manufacture of UAVs and cruise missiles.

The Syrian military is still a long way from posing an immediate strategic threat to Israel. Many challenges remain before it recovers its full strength, led by insufficient funding and manpower to allow it to build up its forces. But Syria’s capability to produce arms and ammunition and the efforts underway to rebuild the military, partly through air-defense systems, as well as the regime’s chemical-weapons capabilities and the possibility that it could resume its nuclear program, signal that this is already [reemerging as a] threat.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.