The junior partner to China and Russia in the anti-American coalition is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yesterday, a U.S. navy ship intercepted missiles launched from Yemen, apparently at Israel—almost certainly fired by Tehran’s Yemeni proxies. Meanwhile, other members of the same terror network attempted drone attacks on American troops in Iraq. Iran is also (along with Qatar) the primary sponsor of Hamas, and evidence is mounting of its role in the October 7 massacres. Efraim Inbar writes:

Israelis savor the unequivocal American support for its war on Hamas. Biden’s longstanding and evident friendship with the Jewish state is warming Israeli hearts. . . . Less pleasant to Israeli ears is the reluctance of the Biden administration to blame Iran for the tragic events along the Gaza border. Secretary of State Antony Blinken refused to acknowledge an Iranian role in the attack, even though more evidence of clear links to Tehran is being presented in the American media.

Hamas would not exist without the support of Iran, which has regularly sent funds to support it. Tehran trained the Hamas terrorists, smuggled weapons into the Gaza Strip, and transferred the technology needed to build a local industry capable of producing missiles. And those are the missiles that are launched against Israel’s population centers. [But] Washington’s deliberate blind eye to Iran’s mischief in the region—even when its naval ships were harassed by vessels of the Iranian Islamic Guards—amounts to ostrich-like behavior.

The only recipe for a more peaceful Middle East is for the U.S. to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—or give Israel all it needs to do it.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.