The junior partner to China and Russia in the anti-American coalition is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yesterday, a U.S. navy ship intercepted missiles launched from Yemen, apparently at Israel—almost certainly fired by Tehran’s Yemeni proxies. Meanwhile, other members of the same terror network attempted drone attacks on American troops in Iraq. Iran is also (along with Qatar) the primary sponsor of Hamas, and evidence is mounting of its role in the October 7 massacres. Efraim Inbar writes:

Israelis savor the unequivocal American support for its war on Hamas. Biden’s longstanding and evident friendship with the Jewish state is warming Israeli hearts. . . . Less pleasant to Israeli ears is the reluctance of the Biden administration to blame Iran for the tragic events along the Gaza border. Secretary of State Antony Blinken refused to acknowledge an Iranian role in the attack, even though more evidence of clear links to Tehran is being presented in the American media.

Hamas would not exist without the support of Iran, which has regularly sent funds to support it. Tehran trained the Hamas terrorists, smuggled weapons into the Gaza Strip, and transferred the technology needed to build a local industry capable of producing missiles. And those are the missiles that are launched against Israel’s population centers. [But] Washington’s deliberate blind eye to Iran’s mischief in the region—even when its naval ships were harassed by vessels of the Iranian Islamic Guards—amounts to ostrich-like behavior.

The only recipe for a more peaceful Middle East is for the U.S. to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—or give Israel all it needs to do it.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.