As Jerusalem decides how to respond to the massive assault on its citizens, it will at some point consider whether—and how—to retaliate against Tehran, which, along with Qatar, is Hamas’s primary patron, and whose proxy, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has been fighting alongside Hamas. Herb Keinon writes:

Last week, a senior Hamas commander was in Tehran with other Hamas figures and leaders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Similar meetings between terror leaders and Iranian officials also reportedly took place last week in Damascus and Beirut. While Iran has long been providing support to Palestinian organizations, Tehran has an added incentive now to support this terrorism in the hopes that it will derail a budding Saudi Arabia-Israel normalization deal.

For Iran, a fierce Israeli response serves Iran’s purposes because it will fill the Arab and Islamic world with images of Israeli warplanes bombing Gaza, inevitably triggering pressure both within Saudi Arabia and from around the Islamic world not to sign a deal with a regime attacking the Gaza Strip.

After Palestinian terrorists murdered Batsheva Nigri near Hebron in late August, [Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated] that the current wave of terror “Is all guided by Iran, which is looking for any way to harm Israeli citizens.” Without providing any details, he said Israel “will take additional actions that will ensure the security of Israeli citizens and make those responsible pay a price.”

The question in light of Saturday’s massive attack is whether the sheer magnitude of this attack will compel the IDF to send a military message to Iran.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.