In a phone call yesterday, President Biden urged Benjamin Netanyahu to increase the amount of humanitarian aid allowed to flow into Gaza “immediately and significantly”—this after Israel reopened water pipelines and took other similar steps. Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Tammy Caner examine the actual obligations the Jewish state bears toward the people of Gaza according to international law:

Gaza is no longer an occupied territory under Israeli control. . . . Thus, Israel has no legal obligation to ensure or provide actively for the needs of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip derived from the law of occupation. This includes water and electricity.

Israel is bound by some basic humanitarian obligations toward the civilian population in Gaza under rules of the laws of armed conflict that pertain to obligations toward the enemy’s civilian population. However, these obligations are of a limited scope.

Despite the statement by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant immediately after the murderous attack by Hamas and in the midst of battles against Hamas terrorists on Israeli territory that no supplies will enter the Gaza Strip, it is not at all clear that Israel’s policy toward the Gaza Strip amounts to a siege, as opposed to a wide-ranging closure of the area.

In any case—whether a siege or a wide-ranging closure—the restrictions imposed by Israel are intended to prevent the introduction of weapons and supplies to Hamas and other terrorist organizations, and therefore, they are legal.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”