While David Weinberg is optimistic about the possibility of normalization between Jerusalem and Riyadh, he fears that the Jewish state risks making unnecessary and even dangerous compromises in its eagerness for a deal. Israel occupies a position of strength, and should negotiate accordingly:

Too much zeal for a deal in Jerusalem will boomerang in Israel’s disfavor. Washington and Riyadh need the peace accord as much or more than Israel does right now, so they should pay for it—and not at Israel’s expense. Alas, it seems to me the over-ardor for a deal that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed in the U.S. . . . weakens Israel’s bargaining position. I hope that in behind-the-scenes negotiations Israel is playing a tougher game.

Let there be no mistake: I think that Israel stands at the brink of a grand, historic diplomatic breakthrough. Peace with Saudi Arabia, and by extension an effective end to 100 years of Arab-Israeli conflict, truly is at hand. . . . The opportunity should be embraced, even by Republicans who dislike the boost that President Joe Biden’s administration would get from a deal, and even by left-wing Israelis and liberal Diaspora Jews who detest the boost that Netanyahu would get from a deal.

For two decades, Israel has sought to block the Iranian nuclear program because it is aimed at producing multiple nuclear weapons aimed at Israel. Now Saudi Arabia is asking for U.S. support for a Saudi civilian nuclear program that includes uranium enrichment. Can Israel swallow this in the context of regional peace, or is the danger of a Saudi nuclear program going military down the road too high? Wouldn’t Israeli acquiescence in a Saudi program almost assuredly guarantee and legitimize Turkish and Egyptian nuclear programs?

[Another] issue is the Palestinian Authority, which Israel can bolster but not reward because it remains thoroughly anti-Semitic, violent, rejectionist, and corrupt. But if Israel makes commitments to the U.S. and/or Saudi Arabia about steps to calm the situation in the territories, and if the Saudis begin investing billions in propping up the Palestinian Authority (as their way of compensating for the peace with Israel)—what will be when Israel inevitably must strike at its enemies? Will Israel’s hands be tied?

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.