Last week, agitators disrupted an outdoor Yom Kippur service taking place in Tel Aviv’s central Dizengoff Square. The attack followed a court ruling against the organizers of the service, which had determined that sex-segregated prayer cannot take place in Tel Aviv’s public spaces. (The court has not tried to apply this ruling to Muslim worship, which, like most Jewish worship in Israel, usually involves separate seating for men and women.) The editors of the Jerusalem Post comment:

Why, one must ask, did a prayer service that has taken place annually, without incident, since the onset of the coronavirus, turn so ugly this year? Why was there no uproar last year, or the year before, when a partition was rolled out for the prayers?

The reason lies not in the [seating arrangements], but goes much deeper and is related to fears and beliefs. It is the fear among the ardently secular that their way of life is endangered. It is the belief among the ardently religious that vaunted liberal values—“live and let live”—apply to everyone but them.

There was a time when this type of prayer service, just like refraining from eating [leaven] on Passover in a hospital, did not necessitate state intervention; when it did not require legislation; when it could all be managed with common sense, mutual respect, and basic decency. There was a time when issues such as these were governed by the simple understanding that if I know something bothers you, I won’t intentionally provoke you by doing it in your face. I’ll respect you, as I expect you to respect me.

A collapse of mutual respect emerged on Yom Kippur in Dizengoff Square. In Israel, circa 2023, everything is considered a “slippery slope,” everything is a matter of principle over which it is impossible to compromise.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.