Early Saturday morning, Hamas launched over 2,000 rockets from Gaza into Israel, while sending about 1,000 terrorists through the border fence to commit acts of murder and barbarism. As of Sunday evening, over 700 Israelis—overwhelmingly civilians—have been killed, and over 100 are being held hostage in the Gaza Strip. Elliott Abrams examines how this war will transform the Jewish state’s situation:

For several years, and especially in the last year, it seemed that Hamas had decided to seek calm in Gaza, where it governs, while supporting violence and terror in the West Bank. And in the West Bank, terrorist attacks increased each month. Meanwhile, Israel allowed 17,000 workers to enter Israel from Gaza each day, and there was talk of raising that number to 30,000. It seemed that there was a silent agreement between Israel and Hamas to keep things quiet in Gaza.

But that view assumed that Hamas cared about the lives of the Gaza population, and the new attacks have proved yet again that it does not. Recent accounts of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 have noted the problem of the “conception” back then. Israeli security officials came to believe that after the crushing Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, an attack so few years afterward was inconceivable. Then it happened. In this case, the “conception” was that Israel could reach a modus vivendi with Hamas—because Hamas valued calm in its base, Gaza. Obviously, it does not.

Why did Hamas attack now? No recent event in Gaza explains the timing—nor do recent visits to the Temple Mount by Israelis. What seems obvious is true: the attack was timed for the 50th anniversary of the surprise attack in 1973. No doubt Hamas must be hoping as well to delay and even prevent the Israeli-Saudi rapprochement that is being discussed, but this attack has been in the planning for many months. When the planning began, Hamas had no way to know where a Saudi-Israeli negotiation would stand in October. What it did know was that the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur attack would occur this year on a Sabbath and during Jewish holy days (the last two days of the Sukkot festival). The possible delay in a Saudi-Israel deal was surely a happy addition for Hamas but was an add-on, not the original motive.

One can see other motives. This attack shows the world and shows Palestinians that Hamas is strong, while the Palestinian Authority and PLO are weak. And it shows Iran the same thing, perhaps giving hope to Hamas leaders that Iran will give them even more support.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.