One reason that it will be hard to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip is that the highest echelon of the group’s leadership is directing the war from the comfort of hotel suites in Qatar, where they live under the protection of a U.S. ally. Other senior figures in the movement reside in Lebanon. If Washington really wants to help Israel, and score victories without putting civilian lives at risk, it should demand that these countries turn over these masters of terror. David Levy explains how:

The United States designated Hamas as a terrorist organization in 1995. If extradited, U.S. federal charges against Hamas leaders could include conspiracy to murder Americans overseas. This charge was brought against Ibrahim Suleiman Adnan Adam Harun, who was sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to murder American military personnel in Afghanistan. Also possible is conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.

The U.S. does not have extradition agreements with Qatar or Lebanon, but it has leverage. In requesting extradition from Qatar, Washington has some influence over Doha. Initially, Doha will almost certainly not accept. However, the U.S. can orchestrate the desired outcome with a well-constructed “carrot and stick” approach. The U.S. has a significant military presence in Qatar, including the Al Udeid Air Base, a crucial regional strategic asset. The future of this base and broader military cooperation, such as access to military sales, could be used as a bargaining chip. Economic levers could offer incentives like future trade deals or impose targeted sanctions against individuals or entities.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.