One reason that it will be hard to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip is that the highest echelon of the group’s leadership is directing the war from the comfort of hotel suites in Qatar, where they live under the protection of a U.S. ally. Other senior figures in the movement reside in Lebanon. If Washington really wants to help Israel, and score victories without putting civilian lives at risk, it should demand that these countries turn over these masters of terror. David Levy explains how:

The United States designated Hamas as a terrorist organization in 1995. If extradited, U.S. federal charges against Hamas leaders could include conspiracy to murder Americans overseas. This charge was brought against Ibrahim Suleiman Adnan Adam Harun, who was sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to murder American military personnel in Afghanistan. Also possible is conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.

The U.S. does not have extradition agreements with Qatar or Lebanon, but it has leverage. In requesting extradition from Qatar, Washington has some influence over Doha. Initially, Doha will almost certainly not accept. However, the U.S. can orchestrate the desired outcome with a well-constructed “carrot and stick” approach. The U.S. has a significant military presence in Qatar, including the Al Udeid Air Base, a crucial regional strategic asset. The future of this base and broader military cooperation, such as access to military sales, could be used as a bargaining chip. Economic levers could offer incentives like future trade deals or impose targeted sanctions against individuals or entities.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.