While Israelis are still burying their dead, those who enjoy the safety of the West are rushing to find way to condemn them for taking measures to defend themselves. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s announcement on Sunday that the IDF is imposing a “complete siege” on Gaza has thus prompted accusations that the Jewish state is itself committing war crimes. Such accusations display a complete ignorance of international law, as Avi Bell and Erielle Davidson explain:

Both the Geneva and Hague conventions include instructions on conducting sieges under international law, recognizing they may be effective tools for bringing a conflict to a rapid and successful end. The basic rule they outline: sieges are lawful unless deliberately aimed at starving the local population.

International pressure demanding Israel provide terrorists with electricity and other goods is absurd and without basis in international law. As the besieging state, Israel is not required to fund or assist Hamas’ war effort as it attempts to butcher Jews. Siege law includes a humanitarian aspect: international law requires that Israel facilitate the passage of food and medicine by third parties, but only if such goods can be reliably delivered without diversion to Hamas and without fear the goods will give Hamas an economic and military boost. Given Hamas’s sixteen-year exploitation of humanitarian aid and infiltration of human-rights and international organizations in Gaza, diversion is not merely a possibility—it is a certainty.

If governments and international organizations are serious about aiding Gazan civilians—to date, such organizations have been more invested in condemning Israel and immunizing Palestinian terrorists from accountability and punishment—they should devote their resources to facilitating the safe and rapid evacuation of Gaza’s civilian population outside the conflict zone. While this is a heady mission, it is not impossible: indeed, five times the population of Gaza was evacuated from Ukraine under fire.

Removing Gaza’s civilians will prevent them from being harmed as lawful collateral damage and block Hamas from using them as human shields. Humanitarian efforts should focus on cooperating with Israel and Egypt to allow Palestinians to surrender at Gaza’s Egyptian border, go through Israeli screening to prevent hostage smuggling or terrorists’ escape and reach safe locations outside the Middle East.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.