Last week, the IDF released photos of its soldiers holding up an Israeli flag in what used to be the Gaza parliament building. Later, the building was destroyed. Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports have been circulating over the weekend of a possible deal to release some hostages in exchange for a five-day ceasefire. Meir Ben-Shabbat assesses these developments:

It is crucial that Hamas’s governing facilities not only be seized but also completely destroyed after being cleared. This is the way to disabuse Hamas of its hope that Gaza will return to the days before October 7. This must be done not only through military activity. Israel must destroy the Kerem Shalom and Erez border crossings, so as to make it clear there will never be a return to the situation in which Palestinians can enter Israel. . . .

The immediate goal of Hamas is to have Israel stop fighting while creating a channel that allows the terrorist organization to maximize its gains from the hostages it holds. Hamas is pinning its hopes on Qatari mediation efforts, internal pressure in Israel on this issue, and international pressure on Israel regarding humanitarian issues. As expected, with the assistance of Qatar—whose main interest is to ensure Hamas’s survival—Hamas has put out the bait and started waving with their assets to achieve their goals.

Accordingly, if Israel wants to get more opportunities to secure the hostages while lowering the price of a deal and increasing its likelihood, it is crucial to continue with the military campaign while ratcheting up pressure on Qatar. . . . It is time to change the policy towards Qatar by demanding that the United States act against it not only with “carrots” but also with “sticks,” [by threatening] to reconsider its relationship with the sheikhdom.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.