Wednesday’s newsletter included an item about the ballistic missiles Houthi rebels in Jordan launched at Israel. As significant as the fact that these missiles were launched is the fact that the IDF shot one of them down with its Arrow missile-defense system. The Arrow represents the top tier in Israel’s layered defensive apparatus—designed for long-range, high-altitude projectiles—while the Iron Dome intercepts low-altitude rockets and David’s Sling defends against everything in between. Yonah Jeremy Bob explains:

[T]his was not the first time the Arrow shot something down. In 2017, it shot down a Syrian surface-to-air missile that missed Israeli aircraft and sailed into Israeli airspace. But . . . the ballistic missile from Yemen was a much more difficult target and was the quality of target for which the Arrow was produced.

In 2022, then-U.S. CENTCOM chief General Kenneth McKenzie said that Iran had over 3,000 ballistic missiles, not counting its increasing number of cruise missiles. Only a portion of these can reach Israel, but the point is that, since the 1990s, the Islamic Republic has had weapons that could reach Israel, and while Jerusalem hoped that its Arrow missile shield would hold up, it had never been fully tested.

Certainly, it was a shot of confidence in the arm when Germany purchased the Arrow system, with a historic signing last month. But there is nothing like actually shooting down a high-quality ballistic missile with all of the real stress of an operational situation.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.