Wednesday’s newsletter included an item about the ballistic missiles Houthi rebels in Jordan launched at Israel. As significant as the fact that these missiles were launched is the fact that the IDF shot one of them down with its Arrow missile-defense system. The Arrow represents the top tier in Israel’s layered defensive apparatus—designed for long-range, high-altitude projectiles—while the Iron Dome intercepts low-altitude rockets and David’s Sling defends against everything in between. Yonah Jeremy Bob explains:

[T]his was not the first time the Arrow shot something down. In 2017, it shot down a Syrian surface-to-air missile that missed Israeli aircraft and sailed into Israeli airspace. But . . . the ballistic missile from Yemen was a much more difficult target and was the quality of target for which the Arrow was produced.

In 2022, then-U.S. CENTCOM chief General Kenneth McKenzie said that Iran had over 3,000 ballistic missiles, not counting its increasing number of cruise missiles. Only a portion of these can reach Israel, but the point is that, since the 1990s, the Islamic Republic has had weapons that could reach Israel, and while Jerusalem hoped that its Arrow missile shield would hold up, it had never been fully tested.

Certainly, it was a shot of confidence in the arm when Germany purchased the Arrow system, with a historic signing last month. But there is nothing like actually shooting down a high-quality ballistic missile with all of the real stress of an operational situation.

Below, today’s newsletter will return to some other reflections on the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of the current war, but first something must be said of its recent progress. Israel has kept up its aerial and ground assault on Hizballah, and may have already killed the successor to Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader it eliminated less than two weeks ago. Matthew Levitt assesses the current state of the Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, in his view, is now “a shadow of its former self.” Indeed, he adds,

it is no exaggeration to say that the Hizballah of two weeks ago no longer exists. And since Hizballah was the backbone of Iran’s network of militant proxies, its so-called axis of resistance, Iran’s strategy of arming and deploying proxy groups throughout the region is suddenly at risk as well.

Hizballah’s attacks put increasing pressure on Israel, as intended, only that pressure did not lead Israelis to stop targeting Hamas so much as it chipped away at Israel’s fears about the cost of military action to address the military threats posed by Hizballah.

At the same time, Levitt explains, Hizballah still poses a serious threat, as it demonstrated last night when its missiles struck Haifa and Tiberias, injuring at least two people:

Hizballah still maintains an arsenal of rockets and a cadre of several thousand fighters. It will continue to pose potent military threats for Israel, Lebanon, and the wider region.

How will the group seek to avenge Nasrallah’s death amid these military setbacks? Hizballah is likely to resort to acts of international terrorism, which are overseen by one of the few elements of the group that has not yet lost key leaders.

But the true measure of whether the group will be able to reconstitute itself, even over many years, is whether Iran can restock Hizballah’s sophisticated arsenal. Tehran’s network of proxy groups—from Hizballah to Hamas to the Houthis—is only as dangerous as it is today because of Iran’s provision of weapons and money. Whatever Hizballah does next, Western governments must prioritize cutting off Tehran’s ability to arm and fund its proxies.