With a hostage deal likely, Israelis are thinking of the case of Gilad Shalit, a soldier captured by Hamas—using a tunnel—in 2006. He was released in 2011 in exchange for 1,027 terrorists held by Israel. Among them was Yahya Sinwar, who is now the governor of Gaza and the mastermind of the October 7 attacks. Many Israelis have reasonably concluded that the deal made the price of Israeli hostages far too high, and helped pave the way for the current crisis.

It is with this in mind that Elliot Jager considers the Israeli security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s recent proposal that convicted terrorists be eligible for the death penalty. Jager, while making clear that he is anything but an admirer of Ben-Gvir, observes that if terrorists like Sinwar were executed, Jerusalem wouldn’t be faced with the dilemma of whether to exchange them for hostages:

[A]fter what happened on Black Saturday, October 7, any claim that the death penalty would paint our enemies into a corner is risible. Certainly, the death penalty should not be off the table for a defendant convicted of the premeditated killing of multiple victims. I accept that capital punishment may not be a deterrent, certainly not for political or Islamist-inspired terrorism. That said, to my knowledge, no executed killer has ever killed again, nor has anyone ever been taken hostage to get a dead man out of prison.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.