On Sunday, the IDF announced the discovery of the largest tunnel it has found so far in Hamas’s extensive subterranean network; it is wide enough to drive a car through, goes down 165 feet below the ground, and is over three miles in length. Many of these passageways are reinforced not just with concrete but with steel, which is more effective, more expensive, and requires greater technological know-how to use. To this end, Hamas reportedly has its own military research-and-development team, and has also received assistance from North Korean combat engineers. Tal Schneider speaks with Yehuda Kfir, formerly the IDF’s leading expert on underground warfare, about the dangers of tunnel warfare:

You need to understand that in underground warfare it’s that much more difficult to assess the enemy’s status, because we can’t analyze what’s going on under the ground. . . . In military history, armies have always found it difficult to know what’s going on with the other side when they’re underground.

To the question of how the IDF can eliminate tunnels without destroying the civilian infrastructure above them, Kfir comments:

I believe the way to do it is by digging from our side toward them, while inserting smart tools—sensors, microphones, robots, anything that can penetrate the tunnels and bring us intelligence on where they’re located. I’m talking even about some sort of underground torpedo, launching an excavation machine with explosives capabilities, at the right time. We need to change the approach to attacking the tunnels from within.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.