Near the end of last month, representatives from Germany, Britain, and France presented the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with evidence of the Islamic Republic’s progress toward building nuclear weapons. Many experts believe that the ayatollahs, if they so desired, could produce enough highly enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb in a week, and enough for twelve in five months. To Eran Lerman, a nuclear Iran is a greater threat to Israeli security than Iran-backed militias in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen:

Under these circumstances it is incumbent upon the Israeli leadership, as well as the intelligence community and the relevant parts of the defense and foreign-policy establishment, to ring the alarm bells and refocus attention (internally, in terms of tasks and resources, and internationally) on the challenge posed by the Iranian nuclear project.

Israel’s leadership must engage once again in generating the necessary legitimacy for action against Iran’s nuclear project—preferably [without direct military action], but violently if necessary. This can be done in conjunction with other concerned nations, but alone if necessary. The current level of readiness facing Hizballah in the north, and the growing signs of Lebanese reluctance to be drawn into an all-out destructive war, create a window of opportunity for such action in the coming weeks and months.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.