While Israeli jets reportedly struck Iranian targets in Syria on Monday, its border with Syria has remained relatively quiet, especially when compared with the escalating situation along the Lebanese border. But it has not been completely quiet: there has been sporadic rocket fire from Palestinian groups operating in Syria (presumably with Damascus’s blessing), as well as attacks on U.S. forces by Iran-backed militias in the country, since October 7.

Carmit Valensi and Tal Avraham explain why the Syrian ruler, Bashar al-Assad, wants to stay out of the current conflict, and why he might not be able to. They also take a look at the regime’s rhetoric and, so far as it can be assessed, popular opinion:

The official discourse in Syria . . . focuses on support for Hamas’s surprise attack and the Palestinian people, while highlighting Israeli “aggression” toward the Palestinians. At the same time, opponents of the regime have criticized the limited regional and international attention to the Syrian people during the civil war, compared to the attention showered on the Palestinians, including global mass demonstrations for the Palestinian cause. There has also been criticism of the international calls for a ceasefire and for an end to the war in the Gaza Strip, while such calls were noticeably weaker in the case of the Syrian civil war.

Some opponents of the regime [accurately] view Hamas as part of the “axis of resistance” that includes Iran, Hizballah, and Syria, express support for Israel, and call for the elimination of Hamas—with the hope that this would weaken the axis. When, at a joint summit of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on November 11, Assad accused Israel of war crimes and condemned the West for its response to the war in Gaza, many people on social media noted the irony of his comments, given the atrocities that Assad himself committed against the Palestinians in his country—as well as the rest of his citizens—during the Syrian civil war.

In other words, it hasn’t been lost on Syrians that for more than a decade, Assad, with help from Russia and Iran, has done to his own people what Western media and activists falsely accuse Israel of doing to Palestinians: indiscriminate bombing of civilians, acts of calculated cruelty, attempts to cleanse areas of particular religious and ethnic groups, the use of starvation as a weapon of war, and mass incarceration in what might best be described as concentration camps.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.