With the IDF expanding its operations into the southern part of the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem has asked Cairo to withdraw its forces currently deployed around the border area in order to protect them from getting caught in the crossfire. The government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, however, has reportedly been reluctant to do so. Jonathan Schanzer comments:

Israelis will soon begin to discover tunnels connecting Gaza to the Sinai Peninsula. There may be dozens of them. The Egyptians have downplayed the problem. But it’s likely going to become a source of friction.

Weapons and cash move all too freely beneath what is known as the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Sinai border. In recent years, these tunnels have also enabled Hamas leaders and fighters to come and go as they please. Once we understand that, we begin to understand how Hamas was able to rearm and replenish after multiple rounds of fighting over the years. We can also begin to understand how Hamas leaders and fighters have been able to get training and advice from the outside. In other words, Egypt is very much a part of the current crisis in the Middle East.

It’s highly unlikely that ideological affinity explains all of this. If anything, it’s the opposite. . . . But the Sinai Bedouin have a lucrative system of smuggling. Historically, the Egyptian military has been incentivized to turn a blind eye to their activities. Today, however, the lax border situation may boil down to a scarcity of resources. The Egyptian government is cash-strapped. The country was in an economic tailspin well before the Gaza war erupted.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.