Israel Is Winning in Gaza

Taking a careful look at the situation, Yaakov Lappin concludes that the IDF is making slow but steady progress toward victory, and explains what must happen next:

More than 100 days into the fighting, the Hamas war machine has sustained severe damage and is being further degraded by the day. Its ability to function as an organized military force in northern and central Gaza has been eliminated, though Hamas prepared cells with the ability to function independently. These lone cells continue to attack Israeli forces as the opportunity arises, with whatever means they have to hand.

Furthermore, according to an IDF source, the Israeli military has been engaged in a gradual, ordered process of dismantling Hamas’s capabilities from the top down, starting with its command structure. . . . Hamas’s ability to switch from organized command structures to decentralized guerrilla warfare means that the IDF must be prepared for a prolonged fight against a determined asymmetric jihadist force—but one that is losing operatives, commanders, and capabilities by the day.

Read more at JNS

More about: Gaza War 2023, Israeli Security

To Save Gaza, the U.S. Needs a Strategy to Restrain Iran

Since the outbreak of war on October 7, America has given Israel much support, and also much advice. Seth Cropsey argues that some of that advice hasn’t been especially good:

American demands for “restraint” and a “lighter footprint” provide significant elements of Hamas’s command structure, including Yahya Sinwar, the architect of 10/7, a far greater chance of surviving and preserving the organization’s capabilities. Its threat will persist to some extent in any case, since it has significant assets in Lebanon and is poised to enter into a full-fledged partnership with Hizballah that would give it access to Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps for recruitment and to Iranian-supported ratlines into Jordan and Syria.

Turning to the aftermath of the war, Cropsey observes that it will take a different kind of involvement for the U.S. to get the outcomes it desires, namely an alternative to Israeli and to Hamas rule in Gaza that comes with buy-in from its Arab allies:

The only way that Gaza can be governed in a sustainable and stable manner is through the participation of Arab states, and in particular the Gulf Arabs, and the only power that can deliver their participation is the United States. A grand bargain is impossible unless the U.S. exerts enough leverage to induce one.

Militarily speaking, the U.S. has shown no desire seriously to curb Iranian power. It has persistently signaled a desire to avoid escalation. . . . The Gulf Arabs understand this. They have no desire to engage in serious strategic dialogue with Washington and Jerusalem over Iran strategy, since Washington does not have an Iran strategy.

Gaza’s fate is a small part of a much broader strategic struggle. Unless this is recognized, any diplomatic master plan will degenerate into a diplomatic parlor game.

Read more at National Review

More about: Gaza War 2023, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy