If the ICJ verdict is a tactical success in the midst of a strategic defeat, a recent warning to the Jewish state from an anonymous senior Emirati official is the reverse. The official told a journalist on Wednesday that if the Gaza War drags on, relations between Jerusalem and Dubai could devolve into a “cold peace.” (To recall what that would mean, look no further than Jordan, whose security concerns are deeply tied up with Israel’s and where a restaurant recently opened with the name “October 7.” The name was taken off the establishment after photographs drew Western attention.) The warmth of the peace with the UAE has so far distinguished it from previous treaties with Arab states.

Yet the fact that this warning is off the record, and its implication that severing relations isn’t up for consideration, point to the durability of Israel’s new regional alliances. Edward Luttwak argues that, both in the Middle East and beyond, Jerusalem is winning the diplomatic war:

Before launching its [1967] pre-emptive attack, only France had been willing to sell weapons to Israel, but Charles de Gaulle stopped all further sales as soon as the fighting started. In Rome, meanwhile, a cargo of gas masks headed for Tel Aviv was intercepted at the airport, even though Egypt’s occupying force had recently killed many in Yemen with phosgene and mustard gas.

This time, 50 years later, it has all been very different. The U.S., UK, and European Union did not try to stop the Israeli counteroffensive against Hamas. The U.S. found itself unimpeded in sending military supplies, while the Italian government came out in full support of Israel.

The necessary ceasefire prelude to every post-war plan is still being held up by Hamas, which demands full control of the entire Gaza Strip, as if it had just won a war. So long as it persists, the Israeli army can continue its war—knowing that, this time, its days of isolation are over.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.