In 1944, representatives of the Red Cross visited the Nazis’ Potemkin concentration camp at Theresienstadt and credulously determined that Jews were being treated well. Around the same time, the Dutch branch of the organization cooperated meekly with the German authorities, refusing to bring aid packages to Jewish prisoners. The Red Cross took the same approach more recently in denying requests to try to deliver lifesaving medications to ailing prisoners held by Hamas. Until 2006 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would not recognize the Magen David Adom, its Jewish equivalent.

The story gets even worse with the appointment of its new director, Pierre Krahenbuhl. A longtime ICRC employee, Krahenbuhl served as the head of UNRWA—the UN organization tasked with prolonging the Israel-Palestinian conflict—from 2014 to 2019. Seth Mandel writes:

Not coincidentally, [2014] was a watershed year for the organization. Hamas instigated a war that summer by kidnapping and murdering Israelis (sound familiar?). In the middle of that war, UNRWA officials were shocked—shocked!—to find Hamas rockets in one of its schools. Officials condemned it as an aberration. But it was only the beginning. A few days later, it happened again. And then again. After one of the “discoveries,” the rockets were handed over to “local authorities.” That is, Hamas.

Unfortunately they were also a time of scandal. An internal investigation found credible claims of mismanagement and Krahenbuhl stepped down in 2019. After the dust settled, the ICRC took him back, and here we are.

At the ICRC, Krahenbuhl will work with the Red Cross president Mirjana Spoljaric. Two years before Krahenbuhl joined UNRWA, Spoljaric was ending her tour there. The revolving door between UNRWA and the Red Cross . . . isn’t limited to the top jobs, either. . . . It’s no wonder, then, that the Red Cross has been such a mammoth disappointment during this conflict, ignoring the Israeli hostages for long stretches and helping Hamas cover up its use of hospitals for war crimes.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.