What did Hamas expect to achieve with the October 7 attacks? To Gershon Hacohen, the answer to this question must begin with the concept of muqawama (usually translated “resistance”) that underlies its approach to warfare, one that it shares with Iran, Hizballah, and other related groups:

The muqawama concept . . . views warfare as a means of maintaining a constant momentum of conflict and struggle designed ultimately to bring about global Islamic religious conquest. In the context of the struggle against the state of Israel, this vision is simple and clear: the goal is completely to eliminate Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel, banish any Jewish presence, and “liberate” Jerusalem.

To simplify the concept of muqawama somewhat, it can be viewed as the inverse of Clausewitz’s well-known description of war as “the continuation of politics by other means.” The muqawama idea sees politics as the continuation of war by other means. Thus, negotiation is viewed not as a means to bring about the end of a war but simply as a pause that serves its continuation at a more opportune time under more favorable conditions.

It is from this perspective that we can understand the logic employed by [the Hamas leader] Yahya Sinwar in his decision to go to war on October 7. From his point of view, after Hamas fulfilled its duty to take the initiative and act, trends would develop later that would advance divine intention.

Israel, therefore, must shape its own aims accordingly:

The central goal of the war for Israel should be that upon its conclusion, a profound disappointment will be instilled in the Islamic believers who started and sustained it. They must be forced to accept that once again their time has not come, and the gates of heaven have not opened before them.

As Hacohen explains in part 2 of the essay, Hamas understands very well that the “desire to avoid extensive and prolonged ground warfare is rooted deeply in Israeli culture.” Israelis still long for the sort of quick, decisive victory the IDF achieved in the Six-Day War. Their enemies have spent four decades adjusting their way of fighting accordingly. And this is why, Hacohen argues, Israel has taken the correct approach, fighting exactly the kind of war Hamas believes Israel has no stomach for. Thus, the sheer “audacity of the IDF leadership and the war cabinet” to order “an attack deep into Gaza’s densely populated, confined, and fortified urban terrain, both above and below ground . . . must be recognized as an achievement of strategic significance” in itself.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.