Much has already been written, and much more will be written in coming years, about the Jewish state’s military and intelligence failures prior to October 7. Taking a somewhat different approach, Robert Silverman examines how Israel’s political system could leave it better equipped to prevent, prepare for, and address major security crises. Among his suggestions is a reform in the composition of its executive branch:

Israel’s full cabinet currently has 38 ministers plus other agency heads. In contrast, Sweden’s parliamentary government, formed, as in Israel, by coalition agreement among parties, has a 21-member council of ministers. In the U.S., the cabinet has sixteen permanent members, and the president may designate other positions as cabinet level (e.g., a United Nations ambassador), but that is discretionary and limited in practice. . . . Both rightwing (Kohelet Forum) and leftwing (Israel Democracy Institute) think tanks have called for a new limit on the number of ministries.

The proliferation of ministries and cabinet members in Israel detracts from national security decision-making, particularly in the arena of foreign policy, where roles are often duplicated. For example, separate ministries for public diplomacy and diaspora affairs—both established under prior governments—duplicate the work of foreign-ministry offices dedicated to these issues, as well as complicating the core work of Israeli embassies and consulates overseas.

If there is to be peace, Palestinians will have to unlearn the hatred of Israel they have imbibed during nearly two decades of Hamas rule. This will be a difficult task, but Cole Aronson argues, drawing on the experiences of World War II, that Israel has already gotten off to a strong start:

The population’s compliance can . . . be won by a new regime that satisfies its immediate material needs, even if that new regime is sponsored by a government until recently at war with the population’s former regime. Axis civilians were made needy through bombing. Peaceful compliance with the Allies became a good alternative to supporting violent resistance to the Allies.

Israel’s current campaign makes a moderate Gaza more likely, not less. Destroying Hamas not only deprives Islamists of the ability to rule—it proves the futility of armed resistance to Israel, a condition for peace. The destruction of buildings not only deprives Hamas of its hideouts. It also gives ordinary Palestinians strong reasons to shun groups planning to replicate Hamas’s behavior.