Commenting on the recent resignation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) cabinet—while the octogenarian president Mahmoud Abbas continues to show no interest in stepping down—and Western pressure for reform, Ghaith al-Omari writes:

In the longer term, the presence of a reformed, capable PA is also necessary for achieving a two-state solution or even taking steps in that direction. Otherwise, the outcome would likely be another failed state in a region rife with such destabilizing models. Two questions will determine whether these conditions are met. First, will the new prime minister be empowered to undertake the necessary reforms? . . . The more independent Shtayyeh’s replacement is, the more confidence there will be in the prime minister’s ability to confront Abbas and senior Fatah figures, many of whom will likely try to undermine meaningful reform.

Second, who will control the cabinet-formation process? . . .

Recent polls indicate that around 60 percent of Palestinians want to dissolve the PA and around 90 percent want Abbas to resign. Appointing a new prime minister may not be enough to fix this wider legitimacy problem, especially if there are doubts about the next cabinet’s independence and empowerment.

Besides all this, both Palestinians and Israelis would be better off if the PA stopped its constant incitement against Jews and Israel and its policy of rewarding terrorism with cash.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.