Commenting on the recent resignation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) cabinet—while the octogenarian president Mahmoud Abbas continues to show no interest in stepping down—and Western pressure for reform, Ghaith al-Omari writes:

In the longer term, the presence of a reformed, capable PA is also necessary for achieving a two-state solution or even taking steps in that direction. Otherwise, the outcome would likely be another failed state in a region rife with such destabilizing models. Two questions will determine whether these conditions are met. First, will the new prime minister be empowered to undertake the necessary reforms? . . . The more independent Shtayyeh’s replacement is, the more confidence there will be in the prime minister’s ability to confront Abbas and senior Fatah figures, many of whom will likely try to undermine meaningful reform.

Second, who will control the cabinet-formation process? . . .

Recent polls indicate that around 60 percent of Palestinians want to dissolve the PA and around 90 percent want Abbas to resign. Appointing a new prime minister may not be enough to fix this wider legitimacy problem, especially if there are doubts about the next cabinet’s independence and empowerment.

Besides all this, both Palestinians and Israelis would be better off if the PA stopped its constant incitement against Jews and Israel and its policy of rewarding terrorism with cash.

Since the war began, there has been a tension between Israel’s two primary goals: the destruction of Hamas and the liberation of the hostages. Many see in Israel’s renewed campaign in Gaza a sacrifice of the latter goal in pursuit of the former. But Meir Ben-Shabbat suggests that Israel’s attacks aim to bring Hamas back to the negotiating table:

The timing of the attack, its intensity, and the extent of casualties surprised Hamas. Its senior leaders are likely still wondering whether this is a limited action meant to shock and send a message or the beginning of a sustained operation. The statement by its senior officials linking the renewal of fighting to the fate of the hostages hints at the way it may act to stop Israel. This threat requires the Israeli political leadership to formulate a series of draconian measures and declare that they will be carried out if Hamas harms the hostages.

Ostensibly, Israel’s interest in receiving the hostages and continuing the fighting stands in complete contradiction to that of Hamas, but in practice Hamas has flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, which allows it to realize additional deals for some of them, and this is what Israel has been aiming its efforts toward.

We must concede that the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents—surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power factor in Gaza—limits its options. . . . Tightening and significantly hardening the blockade along with increasing pressure through airstrikes, evacuating areas and capturing them, may force Hamas to make its stance more flexible.

But Ben-Shabbat also acknowledges the danger in this approach. The war’s renewal puts the hostages in greater danger. And as Israel makes threats, it will be obliged to carry them out.