In 2018, a Saudi-led Arab coalition, after three years of fighting against the Houthis in Yemen, was closing in on the strategically crucial port city of Hudaydah. Rather than encouraging the coalition to take the city and come closer to ending the war, the coalition’s Western allies pressured it into accepting an agreement that left the city in Houthi hands while obtaining only symbolic gestures in return. The Biden administration, entertaining a fantasy of “ending the war,” three years later cut off arms sales to the Saudis. As a result, Yemen’s suffering continues unabated, and the Houthis can now fire ballistic missiles at Israel and stifle global commerce.

Ari Heistein and Nathaniel Rabkin fear that the U.S. is going to try to force a similar plan on Israel before it attacks Rafah, with equally catastrophic results:

The parallels with Hamas in Rafah are clear and ominous. . . . Hamas is perfectly willing to create a humanitarian catastrophe as it defends its chokehold on Gaza—but allowing it to keep control means submitting to its forever war against the existence of Israel, and its constant efforts to humiliate the West and moderate Arab states. Any agreement with Hamas to facilitate some kind of compromise over the Rafah crossing is likely to turn out like the Hudaydah agreement, a fig leaf for continued control by militants who prioritize war above all else, and treat humanitarian concerns as an opportunity for profiteering and propaganda.

Hamas and the Houthis . . . are groups that have mortgaged all of their prestige on unwinnable and extremely brutal wars. . . . Before signing on to a ceasefire with groups like these, we need to see a “ceasefire” the way they do—as a temporary pause until they can gather more forces, develop more weapons, devise new tactics, and then break the ceasefire with a surprise attack, to initiate yet another battle in their campaigns of conquest.

Small in size and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.