On Wednesday night, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant urged the government to end draft exemptions for Haredim. This long-controversial issue has come to the fore with a new urgency amid a post-October 7 eruption of good feeling between Haredim and non-Haredim. Indeed, Gallant in the same speech made a point of saying, “We cherish and appreciate those who dedicate their lives to learning the Torah.” Yitzchok Adlerstein, an American-born, moderate Haredi rabbi, recently wrote about the subject on a blog aimed to a strictly Orthodox audience:

The IDF is strapped for manpower. It is removing future recruits from training programs that were to give them months more preparation (including Torah study in the religious programs), because they are needed now on the front. The term of service has been extended for both regular service and the annual service in reserve units. In other words, a heavy burden has just been made even heavier.

It does not seem so likely that the default response of our [haredi] community—sit back, weather the storm, and watch it blow over—is going to work. There is a distinct danger that if we don’t come up with some reasonable proposal, others may impose one. There are several signs that this may be the case. First, as mentioned, the mood of the country has shifted. Ironically, this is at a time that many who were not sympathetic at all to Torah or Haredim have become much more so in the spirit of unity, and the general move to [greater religious faith] since October 7. Despite the softening of hostility towards Haredim, insistence on some “sharing of the burden” is also gaining strength.

If the yeshivah world fails to offer any proposal at all regarding the draft situation, it may find itself even more isolated than before, and more fiercely targeted by non-Haredim, despite the good will generated in recent months. This would be especially ironic, given that . . . the way Haredim relate to the IDF has shifted toward much greater appreciation and gratitude than before. In other words, we are so close—and yet so far.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.