According to four anonymous American sources recently cited by Politico, the White House will weigh limits on military aid to the Jewish state if it commences its ground assault on Rafah, the city at the southern tip of the Gaza Strip where Hamas’s leaders, and the bulk of their forces, are now ensconced. While it is always unclear how to interpret such warnings, the military necessity of an attack on the terrorist group’s stronghold is perfectly clear. Jacob Stoil and John Spencer explain why by looking at the lessons Hamas learned from the previous ceasefire:

In the offensive in northern Gaza, the IDF achieved operational surprise and performed well on the battlefield. As a result, Hamas’s defenses did not hold as well as it hoped, so Hamas embraced a temporary ceasefire and returned almost half the hostages. During that ceasefire, Hamas evacuated the remaining hostages and much of their leadership to hide among the concentration of civilians in the remaining uncleared areas of Gaza, such as Rafah.

In the meantime, pressure at home and the suffering of Gazans led the United States to put pressure on Israel to change operations during the fighting in Khan Younis, in southern Gaza, by employing a much lighter force package. For the first time, Hamas could see a way forward.

If the United States could be made uncomfortable enough with the continuing of the war against Hamas, then it would put more pressure on Israel to wind down operations.

Ultimately, Hamas’s strategy and unwillingness to negotiate is entirely dependent on the United States acting as Hamas wants—an outcome that looks increasingly likely. . . . In other words, while the road to a lasting ceasefire in Gaza may run through Rafah, its first stop is in Washington.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.