Ron Ben-Yishai examines the two “vectors” that will determine how Israel will retaliate:

One vector is the need to deter Iran. The ayatollahs did what they’ve never done before: deliberately attacked Israel, aiming to cause significant damage and undermine its citizens’ security. If Israel fails to respond to this attack aggressively, the ayatollahs and their allies in [what they call] the Axis of Resistance—as well as regional countries willing to normalize their relations with Israel—may see it as a weakness.

Israel also has an interest in threatening the survival of Tehran’s regime by exposing its weakness. But this is where the influence of the second vector comes into play, which is no less important and is perhaps even more so: the aggressive demand by the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and Canada that Israel refrain from a disproportionate response that could endanger the region’s stability. Such a regional war would also serve Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza.

Therefore, Israel has an interest in responding to the Western demand and returning to focus on the wars in Gaza and the northern border, leaving the schooling of Iran for another opportunity. In any case, response and revenge are dishes best served cold. It’s better to plan them well to ensure their effectiveness, even if it takes time and is done covertly.

In a statement released on social media on Monday, the president-elect declared that if the hostages held by Hamas are not released before his inauguration, “there will be all hell to pay” for those who “perpetrated these atrocities against humanity.” But will Hamas take such a threat seriously? And, even if Donald Trump decides to convert his words into actions after taking office, exactly what steps could he take? Ron Ben-Yishai writes:

While Trump lacks direct military options against Hamas—given Israel’s ongoing actions—he holds three powerful levers to pressure the group into showing some flexibility on the hostage deal or to punish it if it resists after his inauguration. The first lever targets Hamas’s finances, focusing on its ability to fund activities after the fighting ends. This extends beyond Gaza to Lebanon and other global hubs where Hamas derives strength. . . . Additionally, Trump could pressure Qatar to cut off its generous funding and donations to the Islamist organization.

The other levers are also financial rather than military: increasing sanctions on Iran to force it to pressure Hamas, and withholding aid for the reconstruction of Gaza until the hostages are released. In Ben-Yishai’s view, “Trump’s statement undoubtedly represents a positive development and could accelerate the process toward a hostage-release agreement.”