Whatever the outcome of the Gaza war in the coming weeks, it has already led to the decimation of Hamas’s military strength, the destruction of the Strip’s cities, economic ruination, and thousands of deaths. Even in a worst-case scenario, it won’t result in the elimination of Israel that—as we now know from captured Hamas files—the terrorists had planned for. One might think, then, that Palestinian leaders could come to believe that such violent onslaughts are simply bad strategy. Unfortunately, Shany Mor argues that it is just as likely that, twenty years from now, little will have changed.

Failing to learn these lessons would simply continue the cycle of ecstasy and amnesia that, as Mor explained in an essay for Mosaic shortly after the war began, has characterized the Israel-Palestinian conflict since at least 1947. Now, he revisits his essay in conversation with Eylon Levy, a former English-language spokesman for the Israeli government. (Video, 42 minutes. Audio-only can be found on the usual podcast platforms.)

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.