On Friday, Jerusalem temporarily closed some 28 embassies around the world, concerned that Iran would attempt to retaliate for the killing of several of its officers in Syria last week. Amir Taheri puts last week’s airstrike in the broader context of the ongoing, semi-covert war between Israel and Iran, and explains that the “vibes” in Tehran have changed:

[T]his time around Israel has bombastically admitted having carried out a punitive attack against the Islamic Republic. More importantly, perhaps, this is the first time that Israel has attacked a building flying the Islamic Republic’s official flag. All previous attacks were on bases and buildings where Iranian officers and mercenaries were located as “advisers” to the official Syrian army. Tehran could pretend that those attacks were against the Syrian Arab Republic which had the responsibility to respond.

This time the attack was against the Iranian consulate and the adjacent residence of the ambassador, both flying the Islamic Republic flag. In international law and diplomatic norms, an attack on an embassy or consulate is a casus belli. Another factor that might force [the Iranian supreme leader Ali] Khamenei to respond differently this time is genuine anger among his followers, already uneasy about his refusal to back Hamas in the Gaza war.

Israel has broken the tacit agreement that allowed both sides to cite plausible deniability about attacks against each other. If he does nothing he could anger his core supporters. If he orders attacks on Israeli and/or Jewish targets he won’t be able to cite plausible deniability. And that . . . could give Israel an excuse for attacks on big targets in Tehran itself.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.