A month ago, the IDF’s 162nd Division pulled out of central Gaza, allowing hundreds of terrorists to reestablish a presence at al-Shifa Hospital. Troops from the 162nd then engaged them in a battle, lasting over a week, that was one of the most successful Israeli operations of the war. Ron Ben-Yishai believes the recent withdrawal is part of a similar plan, and he is confident it is a sound one:

Specifics cannot be divulged, but the 98th Division’s exit from Khan Younis is designed, in part, to open up opportunities for unexpected, intelligence-guided strikes that will catch Hamas terrorists off guard. . . . Relocating the 98th Division units from Khan Younis puts them less than an hour from any target location, including Rafah. It’s important to note that all intelligence, air, and ground-fire resources currently active in Khan Younis will remain in place, allowing uninterrupted intelligence and operational activities.

The shift to a new strategy offers two key advantages: first, it reduces the forces’ vulnerability to terrorist attacks by avoiding static positions, and second, it enables them to reach any current location in under an hour.

It is important to note one more issue: highly reliable sources say that the move of the 98th Division out of the area has been planned for several weeks and has nothing to do with the political crisis in relations with the U.S. government.

But even if the withdrawal is not a response to mounting pressure from the White House to ratchet down military operations, Rich Goldberg believes it still looks that way to outsiders. And that, Goldberg argues, is a problem in itself, even if the move makes sense from a purely military perspective:

The problem for Israel . . . is that in the Middle East, perception is reality. Look at the chessboard from Tehran’s point of view: Biden is giving Iran a $10 billion sanctions waiver and free flow of oil to China, offering carrots to the Houthis in Yemen amid nonstop attacks in the Red Sea, and holding Israel back from military operations in southern Lebanon to destroy Hizballah’s capabilities near Israel’s northern border.

Now comes a decision that looks a lot like backing down from Hamas destruction in Gaza, too. . . . What Israeli operations will be conducted—on any and all fronts where Iran fights—that put Tehran and its proxies back on their heels? And what steps will the White House and Congress take to make sure Tehran believes the United States still has Israel’s back?

The answer to these questions will determine Israel’s fate—not the timing of any single move in Gaza.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.