A month ago, the IDF’s 162nd Division pulled out of central Gaza, allowing hundreds of terrorists to reestablish a presence at al-Shifa Hospital. Troops from the 162nd then engaged them in a battle, lasting over a week, that was one of the most successful Israeli operations of the war. Ron Ben-Yishai believes the recent withdrawal is part of a similar plan, and he is confident it is a sound one:

Specifics cannot be divulged, but the 98th Division’s exit from Khan Younis is designed, in part, to open up opportunities for unexpected, intelligence-guided strikes that will catch Hamas terrorists off guard. . . . Relocating the 98th Division units from Khan Younis puts them less than an hour from any target location, including Rafah. It’s important to note that all intelligence, air, and ground-fire resources currently active in Khan Younis will remain in place, allowing uninterrupted intelligence and operational activities.

The shift to a new strategy offers two key advantages: first, it reduces the forces’ vulnerability to terrorist attacks by avoiding static positions, and second, it enables them to reach any current location in under an hour.

It is important to note one more issue: highly reliable sources say that the move of the 98th Division out of the area has been planned for several weeks and has nothing to do with the political crisis in relations with the U.S. government.

But even if the withdrawal is not a response to mounting pressure from the White House to ratchet down military operations, Rich Goldberg believes it still looks that way to outsiders. And that, Goldberg argues, is a problem in itself, even if the move makes sense from a purely military perspective:

The problem for Israel . . . is that in the Middle East, perception is reality. Look at the chessboard from Tehran’s point of view: Biden is giving Iran a $10 billion sanctions waiver and free flow of oil to China, offering carrots to the Houthis in Yemen amid nonstop attacks in the Red Sea, and holding Israel back from military operations in southern Lebanon to destroy Hizballah’s capabilities near Israel’s northern border.

Now comes a decision that looks a lot like backing down from Hamas destruction in Gaza, too. . . . What Israeli operations will be conducted—on any and all fronts where Iran fights—that put Tehran and its proxies back on their heels? And what steps will the White House and Congress take to make sure Tehran believes the United States still has Israel’s back?

The answer to these questions will determine Israel’s fate—not the timing of any single move in Gaza.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.