Last summer, George Galloway, a leading leftwing British parliamentarian, declared the city of Bradford—which he represents—an “Israel-free zone.” The declaration had few if any practical effects, but is emblematic of Galloway’s strategy of using hatred of Israel and Jews as a tool for garnering votes. In fact, he came to Bradford—after losing an election in another district—because it is the British city with the largest proportion of Muslims. Ben Judah writes:

Bradford is not much of a place to be a Jew. There are fewer than 300 Jews living in the city and only a handful [are] observant. The city’s one Jewish politician is very quiet about his origins, Orthodox Jews are nervous to walk around in kipot, and even a Jewish funeral has been attacked by marauding Muslim anti-Zionist protesters. Even the candidates bidding to dislodge George Galloway now mimic his pro-Palestinian rhetoric, seeking to outdo each other in their condemnation of Israel. The only party that stands a chance of dislodging him is the Labor party [from which Galloway split during the premiership of Tony Blair].

I contacted every leading candidate bidding to represent [Labor] against George Galloway. Most had websites exhibiting photos of themselves at pro-Palestinian protests. Only two wrote back. One Labor hopeful responded rather bizarrely to my request for an interview on the subject of anti-Semitism with a video and transcript of herself speaking at a pro-Palestinian rally. Another, Naz Shah, a Palestine activist I contacted by Twitter, stopped responding when I explained Tablet magazine was a Jewish publication. Shah was finally selected to fight Galloway for Labor from an all-Muslim shortlist.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.