This coming Shabbat, Ephraim Mirvis, Britain’s chief rabbi, will be a guest at St. James’s Palace in London. First, he will arise early on Saturday morning and set off to a 6 am synagogue service, and then he will walk to Westminster Abbey to participate in the coronation of King Charles III. Mirvis puts the proceedings in the wider context of Anglo-Jewish history:

On September 3, 1189, Richard I was crowned king in Westminster Abbey. Jews were barred from attending, but in a spirit of heartfelt goodwill, some Jewish leaders arrived bearing gifts for the new king. They were informed that Jews were not welcome, whereupon Richard’s courtiers stripped and flogged them, and then flung them out of court.

A rumor spread that the king had given an order for all Jews to be attacked. While some Jews escaped, arsonists set fire to many Jewish homes; some Jews were forcibly converted, while others were given sanctuary in the Tower of London. Some 30 innocent Jews were senselessly murdered on the day of the coronation, including Rabbi Jacob of Orléans, the most senior rabbi in England at that time.

These tragic events stand in sharp contrast to our experience as Jews in 21st-century Britain. His Majesty King Charles III has made it clear that he wants representatives of the Jewish community and other minority faith communities to be present for the coronation service. In addition, he has established an unprecedented opportunity, following the service itself, for faith leaders to be incorporated into the formal proceedings. I will be privileged, together with four other senior faith leaders, to greet the king with words of tribute and blessing. At every stage, the palace has been sensitive to the requirements of halakhah (Jewish law) when considering how best to include us. With this in mind, in accordance with the laws of Shabbat, I will not be using a microphone.

Mirvis and his wife plan to present the king and queen homemade cookies, which they are confident will be better received than the gifts of their 12th-century forbears.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.